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Abstract: Since the 1970s, a progressive acknowledgement of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights has developed in Australia, focusing on land rights as a key to empowerment. 
This has come to redefine the uneasy relations between Indigenous communities, 
governments and energy resource developers, the latter having more often than not 
encroached on Aboriginal land and ignored Aboriginal concerns for the sake of direct 
economic rewards. A case in point is that of uranium mining which, well after the 
Second World War, was still used for military purposes within Australia, leaving many 
Aboriginal communities to struggle with devastating environmental and health 
consequences. Looking at Australia’s 1977 decision to proceed with uranium mining for 
peaceful purposes at Ranger (Northern Territory), and comparing it with the more 
recent government approval of the Olympic Dam (South Australia) expansion project, 
this article will attempt to assess how Indigenous issues have been taken into account in 
uranium mining development projects then and now. It will focus more particularly on 
the agreements arrived at between the governments, the mining companies and the 
Aboriginal communities themselves, the outcomes of these agreements, as well as the 
different factors that may have had an impact on how Indigenous issues have been taken 
into account within uranium mining development projects throughout the years. 
 
Keywords: Aboriginal peoples; uranium; land rights; Ranger; Olympic Dam 
 
 
Introduction 
 
[T]he government has decided that further mining and export of Australian 
uranium should go ahead. In making this decision, the Government gave the 
closest attention to the welfare and future needs of the people of Australia, 
especially in the region directly concerned with mining, and the people of 
the world, whose energy requirements continue to grow. (Commonwealth of 
Australia, “What the Government has Decided” 1) 
 
When uranium mining was announced to the public as “Australia’s decision” in 1977 
after intense debate around the Ranger development project in the Northern Territory, 
Australia had already stopped using the substance for military applications. The Rum 
Jungle deposit, also located in the Northern Territory, no longer provided the British 
with uranium for its nuclear weapons program, and British nuclear tests at Maralinga, in 
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South Australia, had also come to an end following the 1963 treaty on the testing of 
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere (Falk and Barrett, “The Australian Setting” 8). 
Therefore, the uranium coming from Ranger was going to be used overseas for peaceful 
purposes as a source of energy since, as Minister for National Resources and Overseas 
Trade Doug Anthony argued at the time, “[n]uclear energy is the only viable alternative 
most countries have available to meet their essential needs for electrical energy in the 
wake of the oil crisis” (Commonwealth of Australia, “Statement by the Rt Hon. J.D. 
Anthony” 3). 
 
Considering its important reserves of oil, gas, and – most of all – coal, Australia was not 
planning on having its own nuclear power stations, but there was still significant 
concern over security issues and possible environmental damage linked to uranium 
mining. The uranium mining process at Rum Jungle had released substantial quantities 
of heavy metals, including radon – there had not even been a dam at the early stages of 
the operation to contain the tailings – and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission 
predicted that the environment would be contaminated over an area of at least one 
hundred square kilometres for at least one hundred years (Falk and Barrett, “The 
Australian Setting” 8-10). Though Anthony acknowledged that such operations had 
been carried out “with inadequate concern for the environment” and “reflected 
environmental attitudes of 25 years ago which Australians would not tolerate today” (4), 
the Government had yet to prove that it could provide effective safeguards to ensure 
that these issues would be addressed. 
 
In the opposition that mounted against uranium mining at the end of the 1970s, 
Indigenous hostility was particularly tangible. This could reasonably be explained by 
the presence of Aboriginal communities around the areas where uranium had been 
discovered. In other words, the people living in the region directly affected by mining 
whose “welfare and future needs” the Government seemed concerned about were first 
and foremost Indigenous peoples. One reason for these communities’ aversion to 
uranium mining was that they wished to preserve their traditional connection to the 
land, which provided both food and sites of spiritual importance, all likely to be 
disturbed by any kind of mining. But Indigenous peoples were also worried about the 
impact that the influx of non-Indigenous peoples would have on their communities in 
the regions where development was to take place. 
 
However, Indigenous opposition did not appear to affect Australia’s decision to proceed 
with uranium mining, despite the fact that this occurred at a time when Australian 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were beginning to be given a level of belated 
consideration, especially through the granting of land rights. Since then, there has been 
an increased recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australia. The current Labor 
government headed by Julia Gillard is even committed to holding a referendum on the 
recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian 
Constitution. In these contexts, although uranium mining went ahead then just as it is 
going ahead now, Indigenous concerns could not and cannot altogether be set aside 
either by the federal and state governments or by the mining industry. 
 
Examining two different examples of uranium mining developments, this article will 
attempt to determine how such concerns about uranium mining have been addressed 
over the years. It will study the Ranger mine project and compare the agreement arrived 
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at through negotiations between the governments, mining companies and Aboriginal 
communities with the decisions reached in the context of the recently approved 
Olympic Dam expansion project, in South Australia. It will then try to assess the impact 
of uranium mining on these communities, before looking into the different factors that 
have contributed to changing the way Indigenous interests in relation to uranium mining 
have been accommodated or not for the past thirty years. 
 
1. Uranium Mining and Aboriginal Communities: Two Case Studies 
1.1. The Ranger (Northern Territory) Project 
At the beginning of the 1970s, substantial discoveries of uranium were made in the 
Northern Territory at Nabarlek, Ranger, Koongarra and then Jabiluka, all located in the 
Alligator Rivers Region, an area populated mainly by Aboriginal peoples. As Peko 
Mines Ltd and Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Ltd envisaged a joint venture 
with the Commonwealth Government to develop uranium mining at Ranger, concerns 
about Aboriginal land rights as well as a choice to wait until uranium prices increased 
led the Labor government of the time to hold back its decision. Added environmental 
concerns resulted in the Cabinet’s appointing a commission in 1975 to inquire into the 
project and report to the public and the Parliament (Falk and Barrett, “The Australian 
Setting” 11). In 1976, the Commission, headed by Justice Russell Fox, announced that 
it would issue two separate reports, one addressing the international issues and the 
question of whether or not it was advisable for Australia to export uranium, and the 
other focusing on the local issues, and more particularly the possible outcomes of 
uranium mining on the Aboriginal communities living in the Alligator Rivers Region 
(12). 
 
When the first report of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry was published in 
October 1976, it seemed to give the go-ahead to uranium mining, stating that “the 
hazards of mining and milling uranium, if those activities are properly regulated and 
controlled, are not such as to justify a decision not to develop Australian uranium 
mines” (185). This was good news for Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (RUM), the 
managing company for the project, which was planning on producing between 3,000 
and 6,000 tonnes of yellowcake annually at Ranger (9). However, the Commission’s 
dwellings on the environmental dangers of nuclear energy, the weaknesses of 
international safeguards or the possibilities of nuclear theft and sabotage were 
somewhat chilling. It also insisted that any decision about uranium mining in the 
Northern Territory should be postponed until the second report of the Commission was 
presented (185). 
 
This second report, which dealt with the short and long-term consequences of uranium 
mining on the local environment – including the people who lived in this environment – 
was longer than the first. It confirmed that such mining would have a negative impact 
on Aboriginal communities. In fact, some sacred Aboriginal sites had already been 
endangered by the exploration phase. Moreover, the authors pointed out that drawing 
from previous experience, it was likely that the contact with a rapidly developing non-
Indigenous community would lead to the breakdown of traditional cultures. The report 
was also somewhat pessimistic concerning the possibility of employment of Aboriginal 
people at the mine or Aboriginal use of the schools that would be built in the regional 
centre planned for the non-Indigenous community, going on to predict an increase in 
health hazards among Indigenous peoples, notably due to the escalating consumption of 
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alcohol that would result from the substance being more readily available (225-233). 
The commissioners were also clearly aware that the Aboriginal communities in the 
Alligator Rivers Region were strongly opposed to uranium mining, and consultations 
with these communities had led to a realization of their plight, accurately described in 
the Report: 
 
The Aboriginals in the Region are a depressed group whose standards of 
living are far below those acceptable to the wider society. They are a 
community whose lives have been, and are still being, disrupted by the 
intrusions of an alien people. They feel the pressures of the white man’s 
activities in relation to their land. In the face of mining exploration, and the 
threat of much further development, they feel helpless and lost. Their 
culture and their traditional social organisation do not enable them to cope 
with the many problems to which this development gives rise. (47) 
 
Yet the commissioners had to take into account another reality, namely that “[t]here can 
be no compromise with the Aboriginal position; either it is treated as conclusive, or it is 
set aside” (9). Eventually, their verdict was clear: “We have given complete attention to 
all that has been put before us by them or on their behalf. In the end, we form the 
conclusion that their opposition should not be allowed to prevail” (9). But the Ranger 
Inquiry nevertheless provided recommendations that were subsequently endorsed by the 
federal Government and led to the agreements which came to define the relation 
between the Aboriginal communities of the Alligator Rivers Region, the federal 
Government and the mining industry. 
 
These agreements took into account the changes brought about by the 1976 Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, which enabled Indigenous communities living in 
the Northern Territory to claim rights to land if they could prove traditional connection 
with it. Under this Act, minerals on Aboriginal lands remained the property of the 
Crown, but Aboriginal consent was normally required before exploration and mining 
could begin, and agreements could be negotiated between Aboriginal peoples and 
mining companies. The agreement on the Ranger project signed with the Northern Land 
Council, who represented the traditional owners of the land, provided for royalty and 
other payments to the Indigenous peoples affected by mining – in 1981, there were 920 
Aboriginal people living in the Alligator Rivers Region (Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 
94). It also ensured that there would be some monitoring of the health and 
environmental impacts of the project, that Aboriginal sacred sites would be protected, 
and that liquor distribution would be controlled. Concerning the relations with the 
mining company and the non-Indigenous community, there would be an Aboriginal 
Liaison Committee, an Aboriginal Liaison Officer, training of non-Aboriginal 
employees in Aboriginal culture, and employment and training of Aboriginal people by 
the company (96-97). Apart from the Ranger agreement, the Government also accepted 
the recommendation from the Ranger Inquiry to establish a major national park – 
Kakadu National Park – in the Alligator Rivers Region. While Aboriginal ownership of 
the area would be recognized, it would be leased back and managed by the Australian 
National Parks and Wildlife Service under terms and conditions agreed with the 
Northern Land Council. This was meant to give more control to the Aboriginal 
communities of the Region over non-Aboriginal use of the land than they would have 
had otherwise (Lawrence 90). 
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Thus, because it involved a long-term and comprehensive land use management 
program in the Alligator Rivers Region which included the local Indigenous population 
to an unprecedented extent, and because of the terms of the agreement arrived at – 
which were probably the most favourable to any Indigenous community up to that date 
– the Ranger project can be considered as a milestone in the history of the relations 
between Aboriginal peoples and the mining industry. It remains to be seen whether, 
thirty years later, new mining projects envisage such relations in the same way. 
 
1.2. The Olympic Dam (South Australia) Expansion Project 
An important discovery of copper at Olympic Dam, in South Australia, was made in 
1976, following an aggressive exploration program led by Western Mining Corporation 
Ltd (WMC). The company, who soon realised they had found one of the most 
significant bodies of ore ever uncovered in Australia, could have started mining within 
five years had the copper not been mixed with uranium (Upton 4-5). Indeed, this was 
precisely the time when uranium development was being discussed in Australia as the 
Ranger Inquiry was in full swing, and it took some time for WMC to gain the approval 
of the South Australian Government and arrive at the original agreement which was 
passed in 1982 under the name of the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act. 
Among other things, this agreement covered the details of the construction and 
development of Olympic Dam by WMC and its partner BP, the royalties paid to South 
Australia, and the joint venturers’ plans regarding the protection and management of the 
environment throughout the life of the mine. The Government of South Australia, for its 
part, was to provide the infrastructure for government and community facilities, 
schools, police and medical services in the new town of Roxby Downs (a former 
pastoral station), close to Olympic Dam, where the mine’s workers would live. It would 
also carry half the cost of the new road going from Pilba to Olympic Dam (158). 
 
Contrary to the Ranger project, which was strongly opposed by Indigenous 
communities who feared that their traditional ways of life would be further eroded by 
the influx of non-Indigenous newcomers, the Olympic Dam project did not meet with 
the same level of opposition. The Indigenous communities in the area were much more 
scattered, and had traditionally been much more nomadic than at Ranger, where the 
Oenpelli community – a former mission run by the Anglican church – concentrated 
nearly 50% of the total Indigenous population of the Alligator Rivers Region (Cousins 
and Nieuwenhuysen 94-95). Though the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land 
Rights Act had been passed by South Australia in 1981, giving the Aboriginal peoples 
of the north-west of the state some control over their lands, land rights were not really 
questioned around Olympic Dam at the time, and the impact of uranium mining on 
Indigenous communities does not seem to have appeared as an important issue either to 
the South Australian government or to the mining company itself. Conceivably it was 
considered that the Ranger Inquiry had sufficiently addressed this question to inform 
subsequent mining ventures, so that another inquiry was not needed. In any case, the 
impact upon the environment was probably of more concern in the case of Olympic 
Dam than the effects upon the Indigenous communities living in the area. Protests 
against uranium mining organised by a group called Campaign Against Nuclear Energy 
(CANE) took place in 1983 and 1984 (Upton 162-163), but this did not prevent the 
mine from officially opening in 1988. 
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From an initial production of 45,000 tonnes of copper and 1,700 tonnes of uranium 
oxide (165), Western Mining and BP managed to expand but became seriously 
hampered as copper prices dropped at the beginning of the new millennium to 
unprecedented levels. Moreover, the effects of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster on the 
nuclear industry, although they had abated had remained of concern. In 2005, BHP 
Billiton, a much larger company, took over the operations at Olympic Dam just as 
copper and uranium prices soared again, conceiving of the gigantic development project 
which constitutes the focus of this study. This project seeks to take advantage of the size 
of the Olympic Dam mineral resource, which the new owners are still absorbing: 
Olympic Dam is actually more than four times larger than the first estimate announced 
by Western Mining in 1982, making it the second-largest mineral resource in the world, 
and the largest uranium deposit (11). What is even more impressive than the size of the 
Olympic Dam deposit is that of the expansion plan, which involves digging an open pit 
whose footprint over the years will grow to be 4.1 km long, 3.5 km wide, and 1 km 
deep. The new mine will also require more than five times the amount of water it 
presently uses per day, and the electricity demand is likely to increase to 4,400 GWh 
annually (the existing operation currently consumes about 870 GWh annually, which 
already represents 10% of South Australia’s baseload demand). Therefore, what BHP 
Billiton’s project will change is not simply the size of the mine but everything around it 
within a vast area: it will require a new desalination plant to be built along the coast of 
South Australia to supply fresh water to Olympic Dam via a 320 km pipeline. It will 
also require the construction of a new airport, a new gas pipe, new electricity lines, new 
train lines, and even a new village to accommodate the workforce, which is expected to 
double (BHP Billiton, Executive Summary 20-34). 
 
One factor which BHP Billiton had to take into account when devising this project was 
that through the 1993 Native Title Act, Indigenous communities now had the possibility 
to claim native title over land which they could prove a traditional connection with. 
Unlike the Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, which applies only to 
communities living in the Northern Territory, the Native Title Act applies to all 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples living in Australia. Though native title 
does not give any rights of veto to Indigenous communities concerning mining on their 
lands, it does give them the right to enter into Indigenous Land Use Agreements 
(ILUAs) with mining companies in order for them to receive a share of the economic 
benefits and have their say about the important cultural, social and environmental issues 
that arise from mining. When BHP Billiton announced its expansion project, the 
Barngarla, Kokatha and Kuyani peoples had already lodged native title claims in the 
Olympic Dam region. Other groups also had claims in regions affected by the project 
(e.g. where some sections of the gas pipeline were to be constructed). As a 
consequence, BHP Billiton had to enter into negotiations with those groups to arrive at 
new agreements concerning the Olympic Dam expansion project. 
 
Consultations began in 2005, leading to the Olympic Dam Agreement which was signed 
at the beginning of 2008. This agreement includes a Heritage Management Protocol 
meant to protect Aboriginal cultural heritage and manage the impacts of the project on 
sites of importance to the Aboriginal peoples of the region. It also provides for 
payments to be made over the remaining life of Olympic Dam for the benefit of those 
communities, the payments being administered by a trust on their behalf. It seeks to 
facilitate relations between Indigenous peoples, BHP Billiton and its employees by 
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employing a liaison officer and providing for cross-cultural awareness training for non-
Indigenous workers. Finally, it aims at facilitating opportunities to employ Indigenous 
peoples directly or through Indigenous companies and contractors. In exchange for 
these commitments on the part of the company, the Kokatha, Barngarla and Kuyani 
peoples have given their assent to the expansion project and to Olympic Dam’s 
operations over its remaining life (BHP Billiton, Main Report 559). 
 
Following this agreement, BHP Billiton released an Environmental Impact Statement in 
May 2009, describing the project and its possible environmental, social, cultural and 
economic consequences. It invited the government and the public to react to the 
statement and then responded to their concerns in its Supplementary Environmental 
Impact Statement released in May 2011. Having considered those two statements, the 
Commonwealth and South Australia governments gave the green light to the $30 billion 
project and signed the new Indenture Agreement (Nash 12-13), which was subsequently 
passed by South Australia’s Parliament in November 2011, despite strong opposition by 
the Greens (Martin). 
 
Just as the Ranger project carried tremendous expectations regarding the economic 
benefits it would bring – some even predicted that the Northern Territory would become 
self-sufficient to the extent that no taxes would be required, and that it would be a 
“leading business and retirement haven” (Turnbull 1) – the Olympic Dam project is 
generally presented as the cornerstone of a new economic boom which will trigger 
strong local growth and narrow the gap between South Australia and the two leading 
mining states, Western Australia and Queensland (“Olympic Dam will start economic 
boom”). But while the Ranger project almost seemed like an experiment in how to 
manage the different issues arising from uranium mining, Aboriginal rights and the 
creation of a national park, the gigantic Olympic Dam project deals with these issues in 
a much more pragmatic way. Hence, the outcomes of the Ranger agreement from the 
point of view of Indigenous communities may be quite different from those that are 
likely to result from the Olympic Dam agreement. 
 
2. The Outcomes of Agreements between Governments, Mining Companies and 
Aboriginal Communities. 
2.1. Outcomes of the Ranger agreement 
Just as there had been a considerable amount of investigation into the possible impacts 
of mining on the Aboriginal communities living in the Alligator Rivers Region, great 
emphasis was placed on monitoring, especially in the first few years after the Ranger 
agreement. While the Office of the Supervising Scientist concentrated on the 
environmental consequences of the project, the Uranium Impact Steering Committee 
enquired about its impact on Aboriginal peoples. It reported to the Northern Land 
Council (the body representing the traditional landowners living at the top end of the 
Northern Territory), which then reported to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, first 
quarterly, then six-monthly (Consolidated Report 5-10). One of its first reports 
confirmed that the anxieties expressed in the Ranger Inquiry still needed to be stressed, 
and that Aboriginal communities remained particularly worried about the contamination 
that uranium mining could bring to their land, as well as the effects that a large number 
of non-Indigenous people coming to work in the area could have on their communities 
(Report 1982: 58). The 1984 consolidated report of the Committee recognized that some 
of the adverse consequences that the Ranger Inquiry had envisaged did not materialize: 
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for example, the new mining town did not especially produce more racial tensions, and 
the miners did not necessarily prey on Aboriginal women or engage in a sly-grog trade. 
However, the report stated that, as predicted by the Ranger Inquiry, mining did disturb 
sacred sites and changed the traditional culture without leading to more Aboriginal 
apprenticeship or employment or, generally-speaking, better living conditions (242-
243). 
 
One element of the Ranger agreement which had a great impact on Aboriginal 
communities was the payment of royalty monies to the Gagudju Association, a 300-
member organisation established by the Northern Land Council to manage such monies. 
From the outset, it was clear that the royalties were meant to offset some of the adverse 
impacts of uranium mining on Aboriginal communities but were also to become an 
important element in the overall strategy of self-determination that the 1976 Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act had given impulse to. As the Ranger Inquiry stated: 
We deem it to be a matter of the highest national interest that those many 
Aboriginal people who currently live less than what they themselves regard 
as dignified and purposeful lives should be given every possible 
encouragement and assistance to improve their position. It now seems 
accepted, and the Land Rights Act is a manifestation of the policy, that self-
determination is a path to that end, and that relationship to land is central to 
the attainment of the necessary confidence, and purpose, and self-esteem. It 
is our assessment that the planning of the Region with which we are 
concerned provides a great opportunity, perhaps the first on such a scale 
which has offered, to advance the welfare of the Aboriginal people and to 
demonstrate to them that the new attitude is real and meaningful (Second 
Report 323). 
Indeed, when looking at how the Gagudju Association decided to use the royalty 
payments, it seems that such payments have helped in the attempt to achieve the overall 
goal of self-determination. 
 
While some communities have used mining royalties almost exclusively as cash 
payments to members, only 13% of the royalties received by the Gagudju Association 
were distributed in this way, representing about $1000 per member per year between 
1979 and 1985. Children’s payments were lodged in trust funds until they reached the 
age of 18 (O’Faircheallaigh 171). The remainder of the royalties was used to improve 
services in the community and to make investments in order to secure a long-term 
source of revenue after the closing of the mine. In terms of services, the Association 
focused on providing more housing as well as maintenance of housing. It also put 
money into health and education, supplying new medical services as well as a new 
school with teaching staff, a new school bus, and schoolbooks. It improved 
transportation by building and maintaining roads and access to outstations and buying 
vehicles and helicopters for use during the wet season. Finally, it offered employment 
opportunities and training for members. Arguably, all these services should have been 
provided by the Northern Territory Government which, as the mining industry started to 
sign agreements with Indigenous communities and royalty money began to flow, tended 
to neglect its own responsibilities. The 1997 report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Uranium Mining and Milling rightly pointed out that “[h]ousing, sewerage, education 
and health are not seen to have improved in the two decades of mining. This failure to 
improve living conditions and related social amenities stems largely from an abdication 
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of responsibility by the Northern Territory Government” (ch. 5, “Northern Territory,” 
1). The fact, however, that the Gagudju Association started to take on this responsibility 
can be used as evidence that uranium mining can contribute to self-determination and 
self-government. In fact, this may sometimes lead to success where previous policies 
have failed. For example, while neither mining developments nor government-led 
programs have led to more employment among Indigenous communities, the Gagudju 
Association owns a contracting company employing several members of the 
community. It operates on a casual labour pool basis, letting employees decide how 
many hours they will work and which work pattern best suits their needs, thus breaking 
with “European-style” employment (Wilson ch. 5, “Northern Territory,” 1). 
 
Investments by the Gagudju Association, for instance in the Cooinda Lodge (Kakadu), 
the Yellow Waters river cruises or the Mobil station nearby, have also been successful, 
despite the lack of financial institutions available to the Association to assist them in 
making the right decisions – something that was mentioned by one of the first reports 
by the Uranium Impact Project Steering Committee as a major problem (Report 1982: 
59). Although many difficulties have subsided, such as concerns about decision-
making, the persistence of poor living conditions or low employment despite a number 
of Aboriginal people working for the newly-created Kakadu National Park, it can be 
said that overall the Ranger agreement has helped in empowering the Aboriginal 
peoples of the region through the royalties managed by the Gagudju Association. 
 
2.2. Outcomes of the Olympic Dam Expansion Agreement 
Although it is likely that some years will be necessary before the outcomes of the 
agreement regarding the Olympic Dam expansion project can be assessed, certain 
assumptions can already be made drawing from previous agreements, from the contents 
of the new agreement, as well as from the nature of the project itself. While the 
commissioners of the Ranger Inquiry saw the Ranger project as “a great opportunity to 
advance the welfare of the Aboriginal people” so that “[i]n this way a foundation can be 
laid for enduring harmonious relations with them” (Second Report 323), neither the new 
agreement with BHP Billiton nor the previous agreement with Western Mining 
Corporation expressed such a goal. In fact, both of them were built on a history of poor 
relations with Indigenous communities. The 1999 agreement between WMC and four 
Indigenous groups (the Kokatha Peoples’ Committee, Barngarla Aboriginal 
Consultative Council, Wukuna Peoples’ Committee and Kuyani Association) seems to 
have arisen only as a result of the Government’s advice to negotiate with these groups 
following the High Court’s 1996 Wik decision that the rights of Indigenous peoples 
could coexist with the rights of pastoralists. It is noteworthy that the Arabunna people, 
who also had an interest in land in the area, refused to take part in the negotiations 
(Mazel). Similarly, while the new agreement complies with the requirements of the 
1993 Land Rights Act, BHP Billiton was criticized for not taking Indigenous opposition 
to the expansion project into account and for the inadequacy of its consultation process 
(Kelly and Deane; BHP Billiton Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement 525-
527). To such criticism, the company bluntly replied that “[t]he position of the 
Traditional Owners, as evidenced in the Olympic Dam Agreement, is not that the 
proposed expansion should be prevented from proceeding. Rather, the native title 
parties agreed to BHP Billiton continuing to expand the Olympic Dam operations” 
(Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement 527). 
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It is also unlikely that the new expansion project will address Indigenous concerns 
about the environment. First of all, in its Environmental Impact Statement, BHP Billiton 
recognizes that there have been breaches in environmental performance objectives in 
the past: a South Australian Parliamentary Committee had to inquire about seepage 
from the tailings storage facilities in 1995, contact with tailings liquor in the 
evaporation ponds has led to bird deaths, and interruptions of the smelter’s acid plant 
has caused untreated sulphur dioxide to be released into the environment (Main Report 
16-19). But environmental damage is likely to go beyond the Olympic Dam / Roxby 
Downs site: as a submission by the Conservation Council of South Australia points out, 
the new project will produce five times the current mine’s greenhouse gas emissions, 
several times the amount of tailings, and increase its water usage fivefold (4). There are 
also concerns that the proposed desalination plant on the coast of South Australia might 
endanger a very rare population of giant cuttlefish, the Point Lowly Peninsula near 
Whyalla being the only known place in the world where they gather to breed. Finally, 
despite the protocol established to manage the impacts of the expanded operation on 
sites of cultural significance to Aboriginal peoples, BHP Billiton recognizes that “[t]he 
proposed expansion would involve extensive land disturbance within the SML [Special 
Mining Lease] and its surrounds over time. [...] As a result, the impact on some places 
identified as having ethnographic significance would be unavoidable” (Main Report 
562). 
 
In the end, two factors are bound to have an impact on the predicted outcomes of the 
new Olympic Dam agreement. The first one is the absence of a land management 
program specifically controlled by Indigenous peoples, such as one modelled on 
Kakadu National Park, which has been a source of investment as well as employment 
and empowerment of Aboriginal peoples in the Alligator Rivers Region of the Northern 
Territory. Without any court decision regarding Native Title in the Olympic Dam area, 
BHP Billiton has remained the primary decision-maker in matters related to land use. 
Arid Recovery, a conservation initiative launched by Western Mining and now 
supported by BHP Billiton, has been successful in reintroducing species of locally 
extinct mammals by creating a 123km2 fenced reserve, but has failed to involve 
Indigenous communities in this project. Moreover, we now know that such 
communities tend to participate more in sectors related to the tourism as opposed to the 
mining industry, but the potential for tourism in the area has remained extremely low 
due to the remote location and harsh climate of Olympic Dam. The second factor which 
will probably limit Aboriginal empowerment is the fact that the royalties paid by BHP 
Billiton as part of the new agreement will be managed by a trust, following the previous 
agreement signed with Western Mining. In that agreement, although the claimants 
sought a form of monetary compensation that would include cash payments, the 
company refused to comply and allocated resources to a trust for community purposes 
(Mazel). The Olympic Dam Aboriginal Community Trust established under the new 
Olympic Dam agreement does take advice from a Trust Advisory Council comprising 
representatives of the Kokatha, Barngarla and Kuyani groups, but the Australian 
Executor Trustees also take advice from BHP Billiton on how royalties should be spent. 
Recently, the trust has focused on education, and it also plans on supporting community 
health, Aboriginal culture, and Aboriginal Elders (Roxby Downs Sun). While there is no 
denying that these programs may bring benefits to the communities concerned, the trust 
itself is still based on an assumption that Indigenous communities cannot decide what is 
best for themselves. Therefore, although it is too early to analyse the outcomes of the 
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new agreement, it can already be stated that it will not work to empower Indigenous 
communities or pave the way for any form of self-determination or self-government. 
 
3. Critical Elements of Change 
3.1. Legislative framework 
The question of how Indigenous interests are taken into account in uranium mining 
projects is strongly related to the question of Indigenous land rights. While the Ranger 
project was concomitant to the passing of the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act, the Olympic Dam expansion project was devised within the constraints 
of the 1993 Native Title Act since the 1976 Land Rights Act does not apply to South 
Australia. This, in itself, had an impact on negotiations between Indigenous 
communities and the mining industry. The 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act was the first land rights legislation in Australia, and enabled former 
Aboriginal reserves or unalienated Crown land to be transferred to Aboriginal 
ownership when traditional connection to the land was established. This, in turn, gave 
the right of traditional owners to be consulted about possible mining development 
projects and to withhold their consent to such projects (Stoll). Admittedly, such 
opposition could be overriden by the Government, and the Ranger project was written 
off as an exception in the legislation, but the Act enabled Indigenous peoples living in 
the Northern Territory to regain effective control over the land and arrive at compelling 
arrangements for sharing mining royalties, leading to the most significant royalty-
equivalent benefits that have accrued to Indigenous peoples in Australia (Kauffman 14). 
The 1993 Native Title Act, for its part, came to recognize Indigenous land rights 
throughout Australia, but those rights – defined as “native title rights” – did not 
necessarily imply inalienable freehold – i.e. ownership – of the land. This Act also 
failed to give native title holders a right of veto over mining, but instead granted them a 
right to negotiate with mining companies and have the matter arbitrated by the Native 
Title Tribunal in case no agreement was arrived at (Kauffman 1-12). 
 
Moreover, both the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act and the 1993 
Native Title Act were subsequently amended in an attempt, it seems, to facilitate 
mining. Under the 1976 Land Rights Act, Northern Territory Land Councils consulted 
traditional owners about the mining proposals and councillors could only sign off an 
agreement with a mining company once they had established that the decision was 
supported at the local level. But amendments passed in 2006 allow for different 
processes to be used to come to an agreement, all at the discretion of the Indigenous 
Affairs Minister (Green, “Aboriginal Land Rights” 90). Similarly, following the 1996 
Wik decision, whereby the High Court of Australia determined that native title could 
coexist with pastoral leases, amendments to the Native Title Act were passed in 1998 to 
restrict native title claims. Although the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination found that these amendments breached Australia’s human 
rights obligations, ungrounded fears that the 1996 Wik decision would lead to most of 
Australia’s land falling under the control of Aboriginal peoples led the government of 
the time to uphold the amendments (Butt, Eagleson and Lane 108-113). It may not be 
entirely a coincidence that the governments who passed amendments to the 1976 Land 
Rights Act and the 1993 Native Title Act actively supported mining. As a consequence, 
land rights legislation currently appears weaker than it was in 1976, when it was first 
introduced in Australia. 
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Another aspect of legislation which tends to confirm the diminished importance of 
Indigenous rights is the existence of legal documents that override existing laws, such 
as the 1982 Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act, which was passed by the South 
Australian Government to allow for the first Olympic Dam project to take place. When 
reading the Government’s assessment report of the new expansion project, it is indeed 
troubling to discover in the chapter focusing on Indigenous issues that under the 1982 
Roxby Downs Indenture Act, issues arising within the special mining lease will be dealt 
with under the provisions of the 1979 Aboriginal Heritage Act, while the 1988 
Aboriginal Heritage Act seems to apply everywhere else (366). Thus, BHP Billiton is 
legally entitled to ignore the provisions of the more recent Act designed to protect 
Aboriginal heritage, provide a framework for consultation, and ensure a level of 
recognition and protection of Aboriginal sites (Friends of the Earth Adelaide 7-8). 
Moreover, the Roxby Downs Indenture Act (which was amended several times to allow 
for expansion) overrides other important pieces of state legislation, such as the 
Environmental Protection Act 1993, the Freedom of Information Act 1991, the Natural 
Resources Act 2004, the Development Act 1993, and the Mining Act 1971 (Green, 
“Above the Law”). Yet it did not prevent the South Australian Government from 
recently voting the new amendments to this indenture Act that gave the green light to 
the new development project, amid criticism from the Greens who accused it of trashing 
state laws in order to support the mine. 
 
3.2. Environmental Impact Studies and Monitoring 
For each of the two projects discussed here, one document was crucial in getting the 
project approved by the state and federal governments: the environmental impact 
statement. This document reveals how particular concerns – especially about Indigenous 
issues – were to be addressed. In the case of the Ranger project, the Prime Minister and 
Minister of State for Environment asked for an inquiry to be conducted under the 
Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974. Although the Uranium 
Environmental Inquiry was required to discuss “all of the environmental aspects” of the 
Ranger proposal (First Report 1), the commissioners decided that in the light of the 
recent legislative developments concerning Indigenous land rights and given that the 
area around Ranger was populated by a substantial number of Aboriginal peoples, they 
had to inquire more specifically into the possible consequences of the project on 
Indigenous communities. Indeed, the second volume of the Report, which was 
published in 1977, focused on Indigenous issues, and the range of questions it covered 
as well as the number of recommendations it made is an indication of the importance 
given to Indigenous concerns at the time. Even though the commissioners explained 
how they had finally chosen to set aside Indigenous opposition to uranium mining, on 
several occasions the report shows how they struggled with this decision. In other 
words, the Ranger Inquiry did raise the question of whether Australia should go ahead 
with uranium mining and, if it chose to do so, what kind of options were available to 
offset the consequences of such mining on Indigenous communities. 
 
In opposition to this, the Environmental Impact Statement produced by BHP Billiton 
does not really question whether Olympic Dam should expand, but aims at presenting 
the expansion project, its possible environmental consequences and the measures that 
have been devised to cope with such consequences. Though the Statement does mention 
that “BHP Billiton is seeking the approval of the Australian, South Australian and 
Northern Territory Governments” (Executive Summary 7), the fact that the document is 
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meant to serve as a basis for these governments’ decisions means that the process is 
biased, since from the beginning BHP Billiton was bound to produce an environmental 
impact statement that would be supportive of its own expansion project. Thus, by 
presenting a seemingly exhaustive, 4,600 page environmental impact statement to the 
public, then answering submissions to this environmental impact statement with a 
supplementary environmental impact statement in which it simply dismisses all forms 
of criticism of its expansion project, BHP Billiton appears to have done no more than 
formally comply with the requirements set by the three governments. In its chapter on 
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage, it explains how it intends to manage sites of cultural 
significance to Aboriginal peoples and details the contents of the 2008 Olympic Dam 
agreement (Main Report ch. 18). But the Environmental Impact Statement does not 
present any detailed study of the communities living in the area under concern, nor does 
it aim to study the possible impacts of the project on such communities. Its assumptions 
that some of its proposed programs will help to develop Indigenous employment or 
forge good relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples may seem, in the 
light of the history of such relations at Olympic Dam, severely misplaced. 
 
Finally, the Ranger Inquiry made no less than 24 recommendations about environmental 
research, monitoring and supervision (Second Report 331-332). Following these 
recommendations, there were effective monitoring and reports on the social impact of 
uranium mining on Aboriginal peoples living in the Northern Territory, at least at the 
beginning. Such reports were presented to the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Affairs 
and the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs by the Uranium Impact Project Steering 
Committee, which had been appointed by the Institute. Not only is there no such device 
provided for in the Olympic Dam expansion project but, as anti-nuclear activist Jim 
Green points out, "[u]nder [...] the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton has veto power over 
public release of information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million 
hectares covered by the Indenture Act, and related matters such as 
government/company negotiations” (“Above the Law” 56). This means that no 
independent monitoring of the impacts of the Olympic Dam project can truly occur 
under the Roxby Downs Indenture Act. Hence, the difference in the initial provisions 
for monitoring between the Ranger Project and the Olympic Dam expansion project are 
an indicator of the importance that was given to Indigenous issues in each of these 
projects. It can be argued, however, that the early emphasis put on evaluating the social 
impact of uranium mining on Aboriginal communities in Ranger disappeared after the 
consolidated report of the Uranium Impact Project Steering Committee was published 
in 1985. 
 
3.3. Political context and public attitudes 
The scope of the Ranger Inquiry and the monitoring program that was set up in the 
wake of the project’s implementation can be partly explained by examining the political 
context of the time. Questions of self-determination and land rights for the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia had become crucial, and it was quite 
impossible to set those issues aside when assessing the Ranger project. Moreover, the 
Australian Labor Party, which had come to power under Gough Whitlam in 1972, had 
reservations about uranium mining in Australia. Hence, when it asked for an Inquiry 
into the consequences of uranium mining at Ranger to be conducted in 1975, it was 
really hoping that this would help in devising long-term government policy regarding 
uranium mining in general, and issues related to uranium mining and Indigenous 
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communities in particular. Though the Fraser government which succeeded Whitlam’s 
in 1975 was in favour of uranium mining and tried to speed up the evaluation and 
consultation process, it still endorsed almost all of the recommendations formulated by 
the Ranger Inquiry commissioners. Indeed, the uranium issue required handling with 
caution, as there was mounting opposition to uranium mining throughout the country. In 
a 1977 collection of papers entitled Redlight for Yellowcake, Jim Falk and Neil Barrett 
noted that such opposition no longer came from conservation organizations only, but 
that it included “all the major churches in Australia, at least three ALP state branches, 
key blue and white-collar unions and trade and labour councils, women’s groups, the 
Doctors Reform Association, teachers’ federations, several branches of the Liberal 
Party and the Young Liberals, and a large number of scientists” (“Recent International 
and Local Developments” 82). A year after Labor’s Bob Hawke defeated Fraser in 
1983, the ALP adopted its “3 mine policy”, which restricted uranium mining in 
Australia to three mines maximum at one particular time (then Ranger, Nabarlek and 
Olympic Dam). 
 
Though there was still a high level of opposition to uranium mining when the Coalition 
came to power in 1996, the new government decided to abandon the 3 mine policy in 
order to develop the industry and increase exports. From that time on, it appears that 
economic considerations have prevailed over environmental concerns, as the ALP had 
also abandoned the policy when it defeated the Coalition in 2008 (although it was 
severely criticized for doing so). With both parties now agreeing to uranium mining in 
Australia and individual states also progressively lifting their bans on uranium mining 
(Western Australia did so in 2008 when the Liberal Party came to power in the state), 
only the Greens seem to speak for those who oppose mining. In an informal discussion 
with a young man from Victoria who had just arrived at Olympic Dam to find a job, I 
was told that “everyone” was quite excited about the new expansion project and all the 
economic opportunities that derived from it, that environmental standards and safety at 
the mine were now much better than in the past, and that the Greens just “didn’t get it.” 
Indeed, opposition may have been stifled by the fact that that the Environmental Impact 
Statement produced by BHP Billiton gilded all the positive outcomes of the mine and 
minimized the environmental impact or made it look as if a solution had been found for 
every single problem that might arise. The lack of independent information has 
accordingly contributed to a lack of mobilization against uranium mining. Activists 
Genevieve Rankin and Fran Gale also note that “[a]nti-terrorist laws which have been 
introduced since September 11th threaten the ability of activists to oppose pro-nuclear 
policies, as the laws now limit further the rights of groups to demonstrate their 
opposition to government policies” (156). 
 
Conclusion 
This study, which has compared how Indigenous issues have been taken into account in 
the Ranger project and the more recent Olympic Dam expansion project, show that 
much more consideration about the impact of uranium mining on Indigenous 
communities was given thirty years ago than at the present time, and that the Ranger 
agreement signed with the Aboriginal peoples of the Alligator Rivers Region 
contributed to the more general goal of self-determination – something that the new 
Olympic Dam agreement does not even envisage. Although the two case studies 
presented here do not necessarily reflect the diversity of the range of agreements signed 
between mining companies and Indigenous communities in Australia, they nevertheless 
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seem to be quite representative of the evolution in relations between these communities 
on the one hand, and the governments and mining interests on the other. 
 
Indeed, while there has been in general an increased recognition of Indigenous rights 
since the 1970s, the more recent high-profile attempts to foster reconciliation by former 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd – who apologized to the Stolen Generation during his 
mandate – or by current Prime Minister Julia Gillard – who pledged to hold a 
referendum on the recognition of Indigenous peoples in the Australian Constitution – 
hardly compensate for the fact that Indigenous rights were severely curtailed between 
1996 and 2008, when the Coalition government of John Howard was in power. While 
the 1970s emphasis on self-government was progressively erased from the agenda (the 
Northern Territory National Emergency Response scheme implemented by the Howard 
Government constituting the exact opposite of self-government), both sides of the 
political spectrum progressively became convinced of the tremendous economic 
opportunities that lay in the development of the mining industry in general, leading to 
firm support for the even more controversial uranium mining industry. By 2006, a 
report entitled Australia’s uranium: greenhouse friendly fuel for an energy hungry 
world presented uranium as a solution to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and loftily dismissed any opposition: 
The Committee does not question the sincerity with which those people 
expressing ‘moral outrage’ at the very existence of the uranium industry 
hold their views. However, the Committee believes that these views are not 
informed by an accurate assessment of the benefits and risks associated with 
the industry and from the use of nuclear power. (foreword) 
It also dismissed the impact that uranium mining could have on Aboriginal 
communities, affirming that it was “not convinced that social problems are peculiar to 
uranium mining, or to Jabiru, Ranger and ERA, but rather that the social problems and 
issues of service provision in Jabiru are common to large Aboriginal communities 
wherever they are located” even though it recommended, at the same time, that the 
social impacts of mining operations on Aboriginal communities be monitored (ch. 10). 
To government support of uranium mining against Indigenous rights, the tremendous 
power of uranium companies themselves can be added, companies who use a variety of 
tactics to overcome Indigenous opposition, to the point that Green talks about 
“radioactive racism” (“Aboriginal Land Rights” 8). Conversely, relative Indigenous 
powerlessness explains why Indigenous issues are swept aside in projects such as the 
Olympic Dam expansion plan. When Indigenous communities can benefit from a 
substantial amount of national or world attention – as was the case with the Jabiluka 
mine opposed by UNESCO – the outcomes are often quite different. They are also 
different when development projects take place in a region where a substantial share of 
the population is non-Indigenous – an example of this is the Angela Pamela uranium 
mine project near Alice Springs, which is strongly opposed by the local population and 
is now also rejected by the Northern Territory government. 
 
To conclude, given the existing legislation, the current government support for the 
uranium mining industry, and the sheer pressure of economic interests, it is not likely 
that Indigenous issues will be adequately addressed in the near future – at least not as 
they were when Australia originally took the decision to proceed with uranium mining 
at Ranger – nor that agreements between Indigenous peoples, Governments and 
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uranium mining companies will be used as effective tools for the goal of self-
determination, no matter how vital this goal is to the process of reconciliation. 
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